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(UN)COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES:
SEARCHING FOR A WORKABLE EXTENSION OF FREE
SPEECH RIGHTS TO CICS
Mark J. Pesce
“No sign of any kind except a small nameplate on a lamppost or affixed
to the front of a house shall be displayed to the public view on any lot. . . . No
sign of any type may be displayed from the window of any home.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Governing documents of condominiums, cooperatives, and
homeowners associations (“HOAs”)2 around the United States are
replete with restrictive covenants like the one above. These common
interest communities (“CICs”) are created to provide owners or
tenants with quiet, manicured, and aesthetically pleasing
environments;3 hence the frequent imposition of outright bans on


J.D., magna cum laude, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2012,
University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank my family, friends, and Rebecca Salk
for their love and support in law school and while writing this Comment. I would also
like to thank my advisor Professor Angela C. Carmella, as well as Judge Robert Contillo,
Professor Paula A. Franzese, Ronald L. Perl, and Michael S. Karpoff for their helpful
perspectives. Finally, a special thanks to my father, who surely never would have
suggested this topic had he known how much I would bother him about it.
1
First Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions, FALMOUTH
AIRPARK, available at http://falmouthairpark.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
Covenants.doc (last visited May 14, 2015).
2
Each of these kinds of developments is included under the umbrella term
“common interest communities,” but exhibit markedly different characteristics. For a
survey of the differences, see Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, The Twin Rivers Case:
Of Homeowners Associations, Free Speech Rights and Privatized Mini-Governments, 5 RUTGERS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729, 730 n.3 (2008). In general though, “[c]ommon-interest
communities are those in which the property is burdened by servitudes requiring
property owners to contribute to maintenance of commonly held property or to pay
dues or assessments to an owners association that provides services or facilities to the
community.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 6, intro. note (2000).
3
A Florida state appellate court cogently described this purpose, remarking that:
[I]nherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote
the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit
owners since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities
in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom
of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned
property. Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub
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things such as pets,4 satellite dishes,5 and political signs and activity.6
For better or worse, the number of Americans living in CICs has
grown tremendously in the last few decades, and CICs now occupy a
significant percentage of home ownership in the United States.7 For
many, the increase in prevalence of CICs has created attendant
confusion with the extent to which communities can restrict individual
rights.8 In response, courts and legislatures have slowly given more free
speech rights to residents of CICs.9 For others though, this recent
trend towards individual rights has come at the expense of the
collective interest.10 This inescapable clash between expressional

society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium
property than may be existent outside the condominium organization.
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); see also Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners
Associations: For Reformation not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 513, 513 (1990)
(“Residential developers often impose servitude schemes on tract and high-rise
developments to increase the desirability of the housing units.”); 2012 Public Policies of
Community Associations Institute, Aesthetics as an Economic Issue, at 9,
http://www.caionline.org/govt/policies/Documents/public%20policiesApril%202012%20update.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“When aesthetics of any one
development look clean, well maintained, properly proportioned and part of an
overall design or compatible color scheme, owner expectations are met and property
values are sustained and improved.”).
4
Mark S. Dennison, Enforcement of Restrictive Covenant or Lease Provision Limiting
the Keeping of Animals or Pets on Residential Property, 93 AM. JUR. TRIALS 193 (2004).
5
Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Radio or Television Aerials, Antennas, Towers,
or Satellite Dishes or Discs as Within Terms of Covenant Restricting Use, Erection, or
Maintenance of Such Structures Upon Residential Property, 76 A.L.R.4th 498 (1989).
6
Monique C.M. Leahy, Annotation, Homeowners’ Association Defense: Free Speech, 93
AM. JUR. TRIALS 293, at § 7 (2004).
7
Statistical Review 2013, FOUND. FOR CMTY. ASS’N RES., at 3,
http://www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014) (noting that CICs now represent a staggering twenty-four percent of
U.S. homes); see also National Statistics on U.S. Community Associations, CMTY. ASS’N INST.,
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 10,
2015) (illustrating that CICs now house almost sixty-six million Americans).
8
See, e.g., Edward R. Hannaman, State and Municipal Perspectives - Homeowners
Associations, presented to Rutgers University Center for Government Services
Conference, at 3 (Mar. 19, 2002) (“It is obvious from the complaints [to DCA] that
that [home]owners did not realize the extent association rules could govern their
lives.”); Susan F. French, The Constitution of A Private Residential Government Should
Include A Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 349 (1992) (“Dreams of
homeownership can turn sour for people whose building or landscaping plans are not
approved and for people who learn too late that they will not be permitted to put up
political signs, for sale signs, or holiday decorations.”).
9
See infra Part IV.
10
2012 Public Policies of Community Associations Institute, supra note 3, at 9 (noting
that attempts to interfere with “community-crafted aesthetic controls” undermines the
“lifestyle expectations of the collective ownership”).
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versus property and contractual rights11 has led to a host of suggested
and implemented solutions,12 but no more clarity in this realm.13 Such
an inconsistency of treatment thwarts the goals of predictability and
deterrence from litigation,14 and it is clear that there is a need for a
workable method of extending more free speech rights to CICs.15
Although this area of the law has seen a significant number of
illuminating publications,16 this Comment adds to the discussion in two
ways. First, although a variety of proposals have been offered for
extending free speech rights to CICs over the past two decades,17
11
The Restatement acknowledges the tension between the two competing
interests, saying that
The law of residential common-interest communities reflects these
tensions between protecting freedom of contract, protecting private and
public interests in security of the home both as a personal base and as a
financial asset, and protecting the public interest in the ongoing
financial stability of common-interest communities. It also reflects the
tensions between protecting the democratic process at work in commoninterest communities and protecting the interests of individual
community members from imposition by those who control the
association.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 6, intro. note (2000).
12
See infra Part IV.
13
See, e.g., Peter Applebome, My House, My Rules. Or So One Might Think, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at A25 (“This is not an entirely new world, but it’s still a vexing
one, where the rules are still being sorted out . . . .”).
14
See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 808
(Cal. 2001) (quoting Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and
Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 318 (1985)) (“The notion that
free expression can, and potentially does, mean something slightly different in each
state even when provisions read identically is not fully supportable.”).
15
See infra Part III (discussing why CICs should not be “speech free” zones).
16
See, e.g., Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest
Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 233 (2006); Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest
Communities and the Rise of Government for “The Nice”, 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005); Franzese
& Siegel, supra note 2; Aaron R. Gott, Ticky Tacky Little Governments? A More Faithful
Approach to Community Associations Under the State Action Doctrine, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
201 (2012); David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations As State Actors: Regulating the Impact
of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995); Evelyn C. Lombardo, A
Better Twin Rivers: A Revised Approach to State Action by Common-Interest Communities, 57
CATH. U. L. Rev. 1151 (2008); Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions . . . On Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 739 (2006).
17
The major suggestions have been to: (1) treat CIC boards as “state actors” and
thus apply state constitutional free speech protections to CICs, see infra Part IV.A; (2)
rely on legislative action to protect free expression, see infra Part IV.B; (3) push
homeowners to pass a residents’ bill of rights, see infra Part IV.C; (4) apply a
constitutional test that analyzes the reasonableness of restrictive covenants (the New
Jersey approach), see infra Part IV.D; and (5) strike down covenants that are found to
be against public policy (the Restatement approach), see infra Part V.
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further analysis of each of these theories is needed in light of some
important recent developments around the United States.18 Second,
few if any commentators have scrutinized the practical implications of
each of the major proposals to extend free speech to CICs, as most
have been largely theoretical. In reality, the application of some of
these theories could make, and in some instances already have made,19
the treatment of free speech in CICs even more confusing and
inconsistent. Therefore, the merits and disadvantages of each theory
must be analyzed to determine which actually presents the best
opportunity to extend reasonable free speech rights to CICs around
the country.20
In Part II, this Comment describes how the “state action”
requirement has insulated CICs from constitutional scrutiny. In Part
III, this Comment explains why CICs should not create “speech free”
zones, but should instead reasonably embrace the uncommon interests
of its residents. Part IV presents the prevailing theories for application
of free speech principles to CICs, analyzes their efficacy, and explains
why each is not an ideal solution to the problem. In Part V, this
Comment argues that state courts should adopt the policy of judicial
non-enforcement of servitudes that violate public policy, in line with
the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes. In Part VI, this Comment
suggests that no matter which solution courts adopt around the
country, boards should proactively amend their governing documents
to better reflect reasonable restrictions on expressional freedoms.
II. STATE ACTION: WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.

18
There are several important recent developments. First, one state has further
developed its unique adoption of a major theory. See infra Part IV.D (discussing New
Jersey’s extension and clarification of its unique constitutional test in Dublirer v. 2000
Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014)). In addition, another state has extended
free speech rights into a more conservative region of the country, utilizing a
constitutional test never before used outside of the state that created it. See infra note
169 and accompanying text (discussing a Missouri state court’s adoption of New
Jersey’s constitutional test in Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Association, No.
12-JE CC0027, 2013 WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013)). And finally, two other states
have recently revived a major theory and applied it to CICs for the first time. See infra
note 42 (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer’s application in Bd. of Managers of Old Colony Vill.
Condo. v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 732 (2011), review denied, 964 N.E.2d 985 (Mass.
2012) and Lamprecht, 2013 WL 6144144).
19
See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 742 (“The Twin Rivers decision is not
a model of clarity.”); Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 801 (citation omitted) (“Robins was
less than clear ‘as to the scope of the free speech rights it was recognizing.’”).
20
See infra Part IV (describing and assessing the viability of each of the major
proposed theories).
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CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CICS
Over the last few decades, and with increasing frequency,
residents have challenged the regulations in their communities.21
These residents have argued, inter alia, that their constitutional rights
of free speech and association are infringed under the United States
Constitution and state constitutions. Until recently, these suits have
been relatively fruitless, with residents having little success in
subjecting CICs to First Amendment protections. This failure can be
largely attributed to the “state action” requirement under the federal
and state constitutions, which establishes that violations of
constitutional rights are redressable only if committed by
governmental entities.22
A. U.S. Constitution
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”23 Flowing naturally from this
language is that the Constitution prohibits only government
interference with constitutional rights, not actions by private entities.24
There has only been one instance in which the U.S. Supreme
Court has addressed residential restrictions on political expression
under the First Amendment. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,25 the Supreme
21
For example, in New Jersey alone there has been a clear uptick in the number
of cases the New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed on this issue in recent years. See
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B.
Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326 (1994); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 192 N.J. 344, 367 (2007); Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’
Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, (2012); Dublirer, 220 N.J. 71 (2014).
22
The genesis of the state action doctrine was in the Civil Rights Cases, where the
Supreme Court held that “until some State law has been passed, or some State action
through its officers or agents has been taken, . . . no legislation of the United States
under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into
activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done
under State authority.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
23
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24
Despite this logical conclusion, the state action doctrine has remained in flux
since its inception, and is still considered a “conceptual disaster area.” Charles L.
Black, Jr., Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see also State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (2010) (“In the years following [the Civil Rights Cases], the
Court transformed the state action doctrine into one of the most complex and
discordant doctrines in American jurisprudence.”).
25
512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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Court analyzed sign restrictions imposed by a municipality in a
Missouri town.26 After a resident posted a sign protesting the war, the
resident was notified that these signs were prohibited in the city.27
After denying the resident a variance, the city passed an ordinance with
a blanket prohibition on signs.28 The Supreme Court ruled that while
a “time, place and manner” restriction was permissible, a ban on an
entire unique medium of expression was an overreach of the state’s
police power, and therefore unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.29
Despite City of Ladue’s promising ruling, it is of limited
applicability in the context of private community associations. In City
of Ladue, the state action requirement was clearly met, because the sign
restrictions had been created and enforced by a municipality.30 To the
contrary, because the boards of CICs are not government entities, their
actions are insulated from the restrictions imposed by the First
Amendment, and thus are not subject to the same constitutional
protections as the Supreme Court extended in City of Ladue.31
There have been several other important Supreme Court cases
that have hinted at possible alternate methods of enforcement of First
Amendment rights against private entities. The seminal case is Marsh
v. Alabama,32 which held that the actions of a private company town
were constrained by constitutional protections because the town
functioned as a governmental entity.33 Initially, the Court extended
this holding, applying the same reasoning to other private entities like
shopping centers;34 but this holding has since been rolled back,35 and
26

Id. at 43.
Id. at 45.
28
Id. at 46.
29
Id. at 56.
30
The Court explained that although municipalities could regulate signs under
their police power, these forms of expression were still protected under the Free
Speech Clause, and thus the municipality’s powers were not unlimited. Id. at 48.
31
But see infra Part IV.A (discussing the argument, advanced by several scholars,
that HOAs should be treated as state actors because modern CICs perform many of
the functions of local governments).
32
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
33
Id. at 508 (“[T]he town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any
other town.”).
34
Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 315, 318 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding that
“[t]he shopping center [at issue was] clearly the functional equivalent of the business
district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh”).
35
See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507 (holding that property does not “lose its private
character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes,” and that “[t]he essentially private character of a store and its privately
27
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the Court’s now long-standing position has been that the First
Amendment does not apply to private actors.36 In the words of the
Supreme Court: “It is, of course, a commonplace that the
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgment by government, federal or state. . . . This elementary
proposition is little more than a truism.”37 Therefore, individuals
generally may not seek recourse for First Amendment violations by
private entities, including homeowners associations, by claiming that
they are “quasi-governmental” entities like the company town in
Marsh.38
Another method frequently cited as a possible means of applying
state action to traditionally private actors is through the doctrine
espoused by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer.39 In Shelley, the
Court noted that “the action of state courts and of judicial officers in
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”40 Some scholars
believed that this holding would and should be extended to other
fundamental rights like free speech,41 but courts have generally limited
owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with
other stores in a modern shopping center”); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569
(1972).
36
See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980); Hudgens, 424
U.S. at 513. Constitutional scholar Frank Askin has succinctly described the Court’s
change in heart and current state action doctrine:
[B]ecause of decisions of the United States Supreme Court that postdate the Earl Warren era, plaintiffs in these cases can claim no rights
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. With the change
in the make-up of the Court following the election of Richard Nixon as
president in 1968, earlier decisions generally labeled as public-function
cases were overruled either overtly or sub silentio, and private property
recovered its legal sanctity when it came into conflict with fundamental
individual rights.
Frank Askin, Twin Rivers: Why the Appellate Division Got it Right, N.J. LAWYER, Oct. 2006,
at 9.
37
Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513.
38
See, e.g., Kalian at Poconos, LLC v. Saw Creek Estates Community Ass’n, Inc.,
275 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 n.14, 590 (M.D. Penn 2003) (holding that the association’s
public functions do not “deem the Association a state actor” and that “the holdings of
Marsh and subsequent cases are [] limited”); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condo.
Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 449 Pa. Super. 124, 128 (1996) (holding that a private organization
“cannot abridge the rights of the First Amendment of the Constitution”); Snowdon v.
Preferred RV Resort Owners Ass’n, 379 F. App’x 636, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the association had not assumed the attributes and functions of a municipality).
39
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
40
Id. at 14.
41
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000)
(describing the varying readings of Shelley by scholars and courts: (1) there is state
action if the state takes any action to enforce even privately made covenants; (2) Shelley
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this holding to racially restrictive covenants.42
Thus, applying the First Amendment to private entities has not
been fruitful, despite numerous initially promising avenues. As a
result, those seeking recourse for the actions of private entities have
increasingly relied instead on the free speech protections offered by
state constitutions.
B. State Constitutions
As an initial matter, state courts are generally the ultimate arbiters
of their state’s own laws and constitution.43 Therefore, even though
the federal government requires state action under the U.S.
Constitution, states are free to impose their own requirements for
seeking the protections of state constitutions.44 Moreover, state courts
usually have more latitude in analyzing the state action requirement,
as most state constitutions do not contain express language
referencing state action.45
is limited to racial covenants; (3) an intermediate position that holds that Shelley
prohibits enforcement of covenants denying fundamental rights, which is one many
state courts adopt).
42
See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n., 29 P.3d 797, 810
(Cal. 2001) (citing Cole, Federal and State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 353 (1990)) (“Although the United States
Supreme Court has held that judicial effectuation of a racially restrictive covenant
constitutes state action . . . it has largely limited this holding to the facts of those
cases.”). But see Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Association, No. 12-JE
CC0027, 2013 WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013) (holding that judicial enforcement
of a private covenant restricting free speech through political signage violated the
Missouri constitution pursuant to Shelley); Bd. of Managers of Old Colony Vill. Condo.
v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 732 (2011), review denied, 461 Mass. 1110 (2012)
(holding that state action arose from a civil lawsuit over a covenant, where costs were
allocated under a state statute); see also generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000).
43
See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“This Court . . .
repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law.”);
Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 57 (1980).
44
The right for a state to recognize broad free speech rights on some private
property under its own constitution was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
seminal Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) decision (“Pruneyard”).
After Pruneyard, only a handful of states took the Supreme Court up on its offer,
including the California Supreme Court on remand (“Robins”). See Jon Golinger,
Shopping in the Marketplace of Ideas: Why Fashion Valley Mall Means Target and Trader Joe’s
Are the New Town Squares, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261, 268–69 (2009) (“In the wake
of Pruneyard, high courts in five other states - Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Oregon and Washington - eventually followed California’s lead in interpreting their
state constitutions to protect at least some free-speech activities in privately owned
shopping centers.”).
45
Compare CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 2, pt. a (“Every person may freely speak, write
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
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Despite that, state courts have nonetheless almost always found
state action requirements in their own constitutions.46 This language,
from the Washington Supreme Court, is indicative of the treatment of
missing state action language in state constitutions:
It is a 2–foot leap across a 10–foot ditch . . . to seize upon the
absence of a reference to the State as the actor limited by the
state free speech provision and conclude therefrom that the
framers of our state constitution intended to create a bold
new right that conflicts with the fundamental premise on
which the entire constitution is based. To do so would not
be to “interpret” our constitution, but to deny its very
nature.47
Therefore, although states sometimes discuss and adjust the
boundaries of state action under their state constitutions,48 virtually all
have declined to impose substantial state constitutional obligations on
this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”), with U.S.
CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.”); see also, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45
N.Y.2d 152, 160 (1978) (“Conspicuously absent from the State Constitution is any
language requiring State action before an individual may find refuge in its
protections.”).
46
See Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 192 N.J.
344, 363 (2007) (“[T]he vast majority of other jurisdictions that have interpreted a
state constitutional provision with language similar to our constitution’s free speech
provision require ‘state action’ as a precondition to imposing constitutional
obligations on private property owners.”). Although this has been the case for
decades, there is a recent, albeit limited, trend towards finding state action by private
entities under state constitutions. See infra Part IV.
47
Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413,
424 (1989). Indeed, some state courts have brutally criticized the reasoning of state
courts that have circumvented the state action doctrine to extend free speech rights
to residents of CICs, including California in Robins. See, e.g., SHAD Alliance v. Smith
Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 501 (1985) (citation omitted) (“[In Robins] [t]here is not
much analysis and only tangential discussion, if it can be called that, of the State action
question. It is evident that the result in Robins was dictated by ‘the accident of a change
of personalities in the Judges of [the] court,’ which this court has correctly condemned
as ‘a shallow basis for jurisprudential evolution.’”); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492,
514, 520 (1987) (“It is significant that the majority did not analyze the constitutional
sections, but rather summarily stated the protections granted by those sections. It
appears to be more a decision of desire rather than analytical conviction. . . . Our
constitution defines and limits the powers of state government; it is not a license for
the judiciary to convert what the judiciary perceives to be desirable social policies into
constitutional law.”).
48
See, e.g., Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160 (“[T]he absence of any express State action
language [in the New York constitution] simply provides a basis to apply a more
flexible State involvement requirement than is currently being imposed by the
Supreme Court with respect to the Federal provision.”).
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private property owners.49
As a result, both the federal and most state constitutions do not
provide any protection to individuals seeking to engage in speech
within the CICs they call their home. This leaves protection of those
liberty interests to private law, where individuals are left with the ability
to either select residences that permit their desired free speech or push
for greater protections within their existing communities. This reality
raises the question: do residents in private communities need
additional free speech protections?
III. WHY CICS SHOULD NOT BE “SPEECH FREE” ZONES
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&R”) serve a
legitimate purpose. Developers generally put CC&Rs into place before
selling any units in an attempt to provide uniform, aesthetically
pleasing environments for people to live and socialize.50 CC&Rs
enforce this relative uniformity, ensuring that no singular unit owner’s
tastes or practices trump the values of the community.51 While some
commentators decry the abuses of associations and board members,52
many insiders instead paint a vivid picture of demanding, erratic, and
difficult owners53 who force boards to be more authoritative in an effort

49

The major notable exception to this is New Jersey, which does not require state
action as a prerequisite for extending the protections of the state constitution. See infra
Part IV.D.
50
See supra note 3.
51
See Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In: Protecting Residential Access to Solar
Energy in Common Interest Developments, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 997 (2013) (“CC&Rs
are aesthetic in nature, designed to ensure uniformity in appearance and protect
property values.”); see also Declaration of Aspen Heights Protective Covenants, Conditions,
and Restrictions, VALDE FINE HOMES LLC, http://www.valdehomes.com/pdf/
valde_ccrs.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015) (“In considering whether to approve
applications, the Committee shall consider and give great weight to protection of views
of other Owners and considerations of aesthetics and uniformity of appearance in
Aspen Heights.”); Welcome New Residents, BENEDICT HILL ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASS’N,
http://benedicthillsestates.org/benedicthillsestates/page.html?pf=yes&page
_id=30#PA1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (“BHEA is a ‘planned community’ of 229 lots
for the benefit of all members to ensure consistency, uniformity, aesthetically pleasing
conditions and environment . . . .”).
52
See infra notes 63–67.
53
These types of actions are exhibited in Preu, where the owner engaged in a
variety of confrontational, and even dangerous, activities that required board
intervention (including placing bags with feces in common areas, obstructing
common areas, and interfering with fire doors). Bd. of Managers of Old Colony Vill.
Condo. v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 730 (2011). The court noted that “[t]here was
evidence at trial of a history of erratic and disruptive behavior by Preu at the
condominium, and of a growing strain in relations between Preu on the one hand and
the board and condominium manager on the other.” Id.
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to rein them in.54 Arguably, if we begin to erode the power of CC&Rs,
we may stand to lose some of the common in common interest
communities.
In addition, there are legitimate arguments made by HOAs that
residents in these communities have waived some of their rights by
voluntarily living in communities subject to CC&Rs.55 The freedom to
contract is a right that runs deep in the United States,56 and courts are
extremely reluctant to intercede when private parties willingly enter
into agreements with certain rights and restrictions.57 As owners accept
the provisions included in their CC&Rs when they move into the
community, some argue that they should be contractually barred from
challenging them.58 These and other factors militate in favor of robust
CC&Rs.
On the other hand, there are compelling reasons to extend more
free speech rights to common interest communities. With the
increasing prevalence of CICs,59 some scholars argue that there is little
opportunity for prospective homeowners to actually seek out homes
that are not burdened by association regulations.60 Moreover, many
54
Id. Indeed, difficult behavior by residents is allegedly common practice in many
CICs. See Robert J. Galvin, Residential Condominiums—Drafting Management and
Operational Provisions, CONDI MA-CLE 4-1 (2013) (“This sort of behavior will be
familiar to those with experience in representing condominium associations.”).
55
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 16, at 779–80 (citation omitted) (“At the root of
the presumption of legitimacy accorded an association’s CC&Rs is consent. Residents
who complain about any provision of the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws must counter
the argument that they read these restrictions, considered them, and signed anyway.
In contrast to one’s membership in the broader society, it is asserted, one’s
membership in an association may be regarded as ‘wholly voluntary.’”); Mazdabrook
Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 511–12 (2012) (Wefing, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that owners should be bound if they have “agreed freely” to live
in a community with restrictions on free speech and ”there is no showing of
overreaching or coercion”). But see Kennedy, supra note 16, at 793 n.106 (discussing
several problems with this position).
56
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937) (“[F]reedom of contract
[is] the general rule and restraint the exception; and that the power to abridge that
freedom [can] only be justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances.”).
57
See, e.g., Almers v. South Carolina Nat. Bank of Charleston, 265 S.C. 48, 60
(1975); Taminco NV v. Gulf Power Co., 322 F. App’x 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2009).
58
See Mark Cantora, Increasing Freedom by Restricting Speech: Why the First Amendment
Does Not and Should Not Apply in Common Interest Communities, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 409, 424
(2011) (“[P]eople living in common interest communities voluntarily expand some
set of preferred benefits by contracting some set of less-favored rights. This happens
every day outside of the CIC context in a democratic society, and is the very essence of
democratic freedom.”); Grant J. Levine, This Is My Castle: On Balance, the Freedom of
Contract Outweighs Classifying the Acts of Homeowners’ Associations As State Action, 36 NOVA
L. REV. 555 (2012); Kennedy, supra note 55, at 779–80.
59
See supra note 7.
60
See Gott, supra note 16, at 220 (“[T]he growing proportion of properties
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residents in CICs are arguably not given sufficient notice that their free
speech rights will be severely restricted merely by moving into a certain
community.61 And even for those who are aware of burdensome
restrictions in their communities, most are nonetheless unable to
bargain for different terms.62
Additionally, HOA boards have been known to abuse their power,
subjecting the residents of their communities to restrictions that seem
intrinsically unreasonable.63 There are countless horror stories in this
encumbered with covenants that provide for community association governance has
made it increasingly difficult for a prospective home buyer to avoid.”); Franzese, supra
note 2, at 755 (same); Askin, supra note 35, at 15 (discussing that in Twin Rivers, many
people purchasing encumbered homes were merely looking for affordable housing,
not the restrictions present in CC&Rs).
61
Of course, recordation of CC&Rs usually gives constructive notice to owners
and binds them. Paula A. Franzese, Building Community in Common Interest Communities:
The Promise of the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 17, 38–39
(2003). There is good reason to believe, however, that residents do not actually read
every sentence of the CC&Rs, and even if they do, that they do not understand the
significance and breadth of every restriction. See id.; see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text. Professor Winokur has suggested that:
[m]ost prospective owners do not intelligently review the restrictions to
which they subject themselves upon acceptance of a deed to land
burdened by servitudes. The documentation typically makes long,
boring reading for laypersons, who rarely retain counsel to review the
documentation involved in home purchases. Even those who read the
restrictions in advance may miscalculate their own future attitudes
toward servitude restrictions, perhaps inaccurately expecting that
friendly relations with neighbors will eliminate hostile disagreements
between residents. Such optimistic expectations are often disappointed.
James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing
Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989).
62
Franzese, supra note 61, at 31 (citing Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 397, 398
(1998)) (“Typically, purchasers do not have the freedom or bargaining power to barter
over terms contained in the declaration, described as ‘a 200-page adhesion contract,
which is merely a stack of non-negotiable, standardized boilerplate provisions.’”).
63
See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 761–65 (quoting Hannaman, supra
note 8, at 2) (discussing the “undemocratic” conditions of CICs and severe abuses of
power articulated in the Hannaman report, as well as other horror stories); Aldo
Svaldi, Horror Stories Prompt Industry Group to Ask Colorado to Regulate HOA Managers,
DENVER POST (Feb. 13, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_19951732
(presenting the story of an elderly couple on the verge of losing their home over fines
that started with a misplaced trash can); Paul Bannister, Homeowner Horror Stories:
Associations are Heaven or Hell, BANKRATE, http://www.bankrate.com/ finance/realestate/homeowner-horror-stories-associations-are-heaven-or-hell.aspx (last visited
Feb. 7, 2015) (profiling numerous HOA horror stories, many which result in liens
and/or foreclosure for the homeowner). In fact, there is even an extensive comment
feed on the popular social news site Reddit, where users post their own HOA horror
stories. See What are Your Home-Owners Association (HOA) Horror Stories?, REDDIT,
http://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/17v1fx/
what_are_your_homeowners_association_hoa_horror/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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vein, ranging from an HOA’s decision to ban all recreation in common
areas64 to an elderly woman who was fined every time she walked her
dog through the lobby, even though she could not physically carry the
dog as required by the CC&Rs.65 In fact, so many associations banned
residents from flying the American flag outside of their homes that
Congress actually passed a statute to protect this right.66 But even
federal law has not stopped HOAs from engaging in this practice, even
when the flag is so small that it fits in a flower pot.67
In sum, although CC&Rs undoubtedly serve the legitimate
purpose of ensuring comfortable uniformity within a community,
many HOAs take this command too far. By often enacting outright
bans on virtually all kinds of free expression,68 HOAs are effectively
attempting to turn CICs into “speech free” zones. This intolerance is
repugnant to the American tradition of vibrant discourse,69 especially
64
Anna Bakalis, Stonegate Villas Owners Say New Rules Unneighborly, VENTURA CNTY.
STAR (July 12, 2008), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2008/jul/12/stonegate-villasowners-say-new-rules-i-feel-im/ (causing some residents to remark: “Sometimes it feels
like jail here . . . .”).
65
Debora Vrana, The Runaway Power of Homeowners Associations, MSN REAL ESTATE
(July 30, 2006), available at http://www.ccfj.net/HOArunawaypower.html.
66
The Freedom to Display the American Flag Act of 2005 reads:
A condominium association, cooperative association, or residential real
estate management association may not adopt or enforce any policy, or
enter into any agreement, that would restrict or prevent a member of
the association from displaying the flag of the United States on
residential property within the association with respect to which such
member has a separate ownership interest or a right to exclusive
possession or use.
Pub. L. No. 109–243, 120 Stat. 572 (2006). There are also state analogs to this law. See,
e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 720.304 (2010) (guaranteeing the right of CIC residents to fly a
flag “regardless of any covenants, restrictions, bylaws, rules, or requirements of the
association”). In reality, the fact that legislatures around the country, including
Congress, have independently concluded that homeowners associations often pass
overburdensome regulations is reason enough to conclude that more free speech
rights should be extended to CICs.
67
Florida Man May Lose Home Over Display of American Flag, AOL (June 24, 2014,
2:28 PM), http://www.aol.com/article/2014/06/24/florida-man-may-lose-homeover-display-of-american-flag/20919158/ (describing a situation where a Florida
veteran was fined $100 for every day that he kept a miniature American flag in his
flower pot).
68
See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (where
the Board left a small bulletin board as the only means of expression within the
community).
69
Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban
Fear, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (2001) (“This retreat to secured enclaves with walls,
gates, and guards materially and symbolically contradicts American ethos and values,
threatens public access to open space, and creates yet another barrier to social
interaction, building of social networks, as well as increased tolerance of diverse
cultural/racial/social groups.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has always stressed the
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when it is increasingly difficult for individuals to find residences that
are unburdened by these types of restrictions.70 Therefore, it is vital
for the preservation of free speech to identify methods to extend
greater expressional rights to CICs.
IV. METHODS PROMULGATED TO EXTEND FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS
TO CICS
Many different theories have been proposed to extend free
speech rights to CICs. The most popular of these suggestions have
been to: (1) treat CICs as state actors, and thus subject them to
constitutional obligations;71 (2) encourage legislatures to pass statutory
protections for expressional rights in CICs;72 (3) push communities
themselves to adopt CIC bills of rights to protect their own speech;73 or
(4) persuade courts around the country to follow the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s lead in finding that unreasonable restrictions are
offensive to their state constitutions.74 While none of these theories
has yet been widely adopted, each provides an opportunity to analyze
and weigh the competing interests in an attempt to fashion the best
possible solution.
A. Treat CICs as State Actors, thus Subjecting Them to First
Amendment Obligations
Experts worry that those looking for new homes are increasingly
unable to find properties without accompanying restrictions on free
speech.75 Therefore, one of the most popular proposed solutions
argues that CICs have become the de facto governmental entity in

vital role of free speech and public discourse, remarking:
The safeguarding of [free speech] rights to the ends that men may speak
as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be
exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential
to free government. Those who won our independence had confidence
in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas
to discover and spread political and economic truth. . . . Abridgment of
freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those
opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise
of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular
government.
Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
70
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71
See infra Part IV.A.
72
See infra Part IV.B.
73
See infra Part IV.C.
74
See infra Part IV.D.
75
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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substantial portions of the country, and should be treated as such.76
Under this line of reasoning, if CICs fulfill many of the functions of
municipalities, their actions should qualify as state action, opening
them up to constitutional obligations.77
There is no arguing with the fact that CICs provide services
traditionally delivered by municipalities. In fact, even the Community
Association Institute, which represents the interests of community
associations, describes the phenomena as such:
Newly created community associations are increasingly
required to provide their members with what have
historically been considered “municipal” services.
Association members must then typically pay the same local
taxes as other neighboring homeowners even though trash
collection, road and sidewalks maintenance and repair,
street lighting, disposal of sewage, storm, flood and erosion
control systems, shade and ornamental tree maintenance,
security patrols for crime, disorder and public safety and
other forms of public services are not made available to
them.78
Because these are traditional municipal services, some scholars argue
that associations effectively operate as “quasi-governmental” entities,
entitling residents to the same protections that are afforded to those
living under normal government oversight.79 In practice, though, this
76

There is also a separate but related argument that extensive regulation and
protection provided by state laws qualify associations as state actors. Nevertheless, this
idea has not caught on and is unlikely to succeed as a rationale for a state action
designation on its own. See, e.g., Yan Sui v. 2176 Pac. Homeowners Ass’n, SACV 111340 JAK AJW, 2012 WL 6632758, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012) (“[T]he fact that
state law governs the formation and operation of the HOA does not make the HOA a
state actor.”).
77
Although this argument is an extension of the Marsh principle, see supra notes
32–38 and accompanying text, it has since taken on a life of its own.
78
2012 Public Policies of Community Associations Institute, Local Taxation and Public
Services for Community Associations, supra note 3, at 54.
79
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 16, at 763 (“Since the ability to wield such power
is largely associated with the state, only by recognizing the quasi-governmental nature
of these associations and their actions can the unique conflicts they engender be
adequately addressed.”). A particularly cogent recitation of this analysis is provided by
Franzese and Siegel, who note:
Presently, homeowners associations: (1) are assuming many functions
and services traditionally provided by municipalities; (2) are often
performing those functions and services with the use of taxpayer funds;
(3) are often the product of conscious and deliberate municipal landuse policy; (4) represent the standard template for new community
development in many parts of this State; and (5) own networks of streets
and open space that, if owned by a municipality, would have served as . . .
traditional public forums for speech and assembly. In the face of these
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notion may be untenable, a sentiment that is borne out in the lack of
support it has received by courts throughout the United States.80
The initial resistance to this theory was that functions performed
by associations do not supplant those essential services traditionally
provided by municipalities,81 or that such claims were greatly
exaggerated.82 Others argued forcefully that although associations
perform some functions of government, such an attribute does not
necessarily qualify them as governmental entities.83 Although these
arguments are still discussed by commentators and courts,84 there
seems to be a more fundamental disagreement with such a solution.
The modern hesitation to implement this solution appears to be
that it works too broad and monumental of a change to American
jurisprudence by eviscerating the state action doctrine.85 A holding
realities, it is simply untenable to continue a laissez-fare regime that
presupposes that homeowners associations are wholly private
organizations.
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 765–66.
80
See, e.g., supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 81 & 83.
81
See, e.g., Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 449 Pa.
Super. 124, 128 (1996) (“While there is sewer service, private streets, and private
maintenance, Midlake provides no facilities for community public use that are typically
found in a municipality, such as schools, libraries, and other public functions.”); Brock
v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass’n, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (“[T]he services provided by a homeowners association, unlike those provided
in a company town, are merely a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, those
provided by local government.”); Ross v. Hatfield, 640 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Kan. 1986)
(finding that the community was not “sufficiently similar to the company-owned town
in Marsh” because it did not have its own police or firemen, its own schools,
independent trash collection, or public spaces serving the business needs of its
residents, nor did the Board of Managers have the powers and rights of a town’s
governing body).
82
Gott, supra note 16, at 207 (“Some [scholars] engage in a disingenuous inquiry
into the services an association provides.”).
83
One court, citing Judge Richard Posner, used an analogy to explain why
associations should not be considered government actors:
There are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, it ‘confuse[s]
an entity and its attributes.’ Dogs breathe, eat, sleep, run, and play, but
they are not humans, who also do all of those things. And it is not as
though the attributes [cited] are those which have been described by the
Supreme Court as possibly exclusive state functions . . . . Demonstrating
that condominiums do certain things that state governments also do
doesn’t show that condominiums are acting as the state or in the state’s
place.
Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 211 (1995)).
84
See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 383
N.J. Super. 22, 43 (App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 192 N.J. 344 (2007).
85
The state action doctrine is a bastion of American jurisprudence. Indeed,
courts have said that “the fundamental nature of a constitution is to govern the
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that any private entity which performs quasi-governmental functions
could be held as a state actor would be unduly broad, likely capturing
many community associations that may not function as quasigovernments,86 as well as corporations,87 unions,88 and even sports
leagues.89 Any test articulated to help determine what would vault an
entity into “state actor” distinction would undoubtedly be imprecise,
wholly subjective, and unpredictable.90 Such a test would do little to
resolve the hodgepodge of seemingly contradictory judicial opinions
on this issue around the country,91 nor adequately apprise boards and
owners of their rights before litigation hashed them out.
As the line between HOAs and local governments becomes even
further blurred, especially as jurisdictions pass legislation mandating
private associations for all new development,92 the calls for treating
HOAs as state actors will only get stronger.93 But because the state
relationship between the people and their government, not to control the rights of the
people vis-a-vis each other.” Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n,
29 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (citation omitted). By chipping away the state action
doctrine, the interactions between private entities would effectively be controlled by
the government, reducing choice and eroding the separation of powers. For this
reason, it is unlikely to ever be significantly curtailed. See supra Part 0.
86
Ronald Perl, former president of the Community Associations Institute,
inquired compellingly: “‘Does that apply to your brownstone condo in Hoboken?’ . . .
‘Is your four-unit building a mini-municipality?’” Laura Mansnerus, Chalk One Up for
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/
nyregion/nyregionspecial2/12njHOME.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
87
Goldberg, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (noting that “[t]he National Basketball
Association makes rules, conducts hearings, issues decisions, and imposes fines, but it
seems unlikely that the privately run sports league is a government actor,” and
discussing how such reasoning could apply to unions and corporations as well).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
For example, some have simply pegged it as a “fact-bound determination,
requiring a variety of linkages between the actor and state authority.” Kennedy, supra
note 16, at 783. Such a test would subject every significant private entity to lawsuits to
determine whether they are to be treated as state actors under this framework.
91
Id. (“State courts have reached wildly different conclusions when faced with
[this determination].”).
92
See Sharon Kolbet, Signs of the Times: How the Recent Texas Legislation Regarding
Homeowners’ Associations Deprives Homeowners of Their Fundamental Free Speech Rights, 15
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 85, 108 (2008) (citing Dallas, Tex., Development Code,
Ordinance 22477 ch. 51, § 2(j) (1995)); Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 237.
93
Indeed, little by little, some courts have used language that seems to support
such a position. See, e.g., Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468,
479 (2000) (citations omitted) (“For many Californians, the homeowners association
functions as a second municipal government . . . .”); Silk v. Feldman, 208 Cal. App. 4th
547, 553 (2012) (citing Damon, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 475) (“Courts have recognized a
homeowners association functions as a quasi-governmental entity, paralleling the
powers and duties of a municipal government.”); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v.
Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 383 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 192 N.J.
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action impediment is such a large one, and because most states have
already dug in their heels against such a proposition,94 this proposal is
likely more of an academic exercise than a realistic solution.
B. Legislative Extension of Free Speech Rights to CICs
Some state legislatures have recognized the shortfalls of suggested
judicial remedies to this problem, and have taken it upon themselves
to protect free speech rights through legislation.95 California’s
experience is instructive.
Early on, the California judiciary led the way in extending
constitutional protections to private settings, holding that free speech
rights applied to private shopping centers.96 As time wore on, with
heavy criticism of its rationales97 and a more conservative bench, the
California Supreme Court sharply limited its extension of free speech
rights,98 and appellate courts followed suit.99 With that, California’s
344 (2007) (“The manner and extent to which functions undertaken by community
associations have supplanted the role that only towns or villages once played in our
polity mirrors the manner and extent to which regional shopping centers have become
the functional equivalents of downtown business districts.”); Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty.
Assn., 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted) (citing a law
review article which noted “the increasingly ‘quasi-governmental’ nature of the
responsibilities of . . . associations” and that “one clearly sees the association as a quasigovernment entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of a municipal government”). It remains to be seen whether more
courts will adopt this reasoning, but it is unlikely that a solution requiring such a
substantial shift in this country’s jurisprudence will ever command considerable
support.
94
See supra notes 47, 81, & 83 (surveying various courts that have rejected attempts
to ascribe state action to private actors).
95
For example, Illinois has passed a statute, 765 ILCS 605/18.4(h), providing that:
[N]o rule or regulation may impair any rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Section 4 of
Article I of the Illinois Constitution including, but not limited to, the
free exercise of religion, nor may any rules or regulations conflict with
the provisions of this Act or the condominium instruments. No rule or
regulation shall prohibit any reasonable accommodation for religious
practices, including the attachment of religiously mandated objects to
the front-door area of a condominium unit.
Many other states have passed legislation protecting free speech in CICs. See, e.g.,
Suarez, supra note 16, at 759 n.116; Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 262–63 (discussing
the legislative enactments of Arizona, Maryland, Florida, California, and Texas).
96
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979); see supra note 44
and accompanying text.
97
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
98
See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001) (holding that California’s free speech right does not apply to private apartment
complexes).
99
Golinger, supra note 44, at 269 (noting that appellate courts further narrowed
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judicial experiment came to a screeching halt.100
Recognizing the importance of certain free speech rights within
CICs, and aware that attempted judicial remedies were untenable, the
California legislature was forced to act on its own. In 2011, the
legislature passed a statute specifically protecting free speech in CICs,
with California Civil Code § 1940.4 guaranteeing the rights of residents
to display political signs without ramifications from association
boards.101 There are some reasonable limitations on this right, but the
legislation nonetheless codifies rights for residents that the California
Supreme Court was ultimately unable or unwilling to extend.
California’s experience offers a model for other state legislatures
to safeguard the rights of those living in CICs, without disturbing the
state action doctrine. Although some have suggested this as a viable
solution,102 there are undeniable problems with such a course of action.
For one, there are questions regarding the ability of legislatures to
micromanage private entities and subvert the state action doctrine
through legislation. As “freedom of contract [is] the general rule and
restraint the exception,”103 some have suggested that a retroactive
the doctrine, holding that stand-alone stores like Target and Trader Joe’s were not
subject to the same free speech restrictions).
100
The California Supreme Court now holds that “the actions of a private property
owner constitute state action for purposes of California’s free speech clause only if the
property is freely and openly accessible to the public.” Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at
810; see also Cal. Prac. Guide Landlord-Tenant Ch. 4-D (2014).
101
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.4 reads:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c), a landlord shall not prohibit a
tenant from posting or displaying political signs relating to any of the
following:
(1) An election or legislative vote, including an election of a candidate
to public office.
(2) The initiative, referendum, or recall process.
(3) Issues that are before a public commission, public board, or elected
local body for a vote.
(b) Political signs may be posted or displayed in the window or on the
door of the premises leased by the tenant in a multifamily dwelling, or
from the yard, window, door, balcony, or outside wall of the premises
leased by a tenant of a single-family dwelling.
(c) A landlord may prohibit a tenant from posting or displaying political
signs in the following circumstances:
(1) The political sign is more than six square feet in size.
(2) The posting or displaying would violate a local, state, or federal law.
102
See, e.g., Suarez, supra note 16, at 762.
103
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937); see also In re Brooklyn
Bridge Sw. Urban Renewal Project (Project No. N.Y. R-67) Manhattan, New York, 46
Misc. 2d 558, 561 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 24 A.D.2d 710 (1965) (citation omitted)
(“While there is no absolute right of freedom of contract, the exercise of legislative
authority to abridge it can be justified only where the enforcement of such a contract
would conflict with dominant public interests. Otherwise a statutory restraint on the
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application of a statute that strips associations of previously held rights
might be struck down via the Contracts Clause.104
More fundamentally, the political will to pass legislation
addressing each free speech issue may be lacking. And even if there
was the political will, passing legislation is often reactive, not proactive,
and would provide an extremely slow solution to this problem.
Moreover, state legislatures likely vary widely in how they view the role
of government in controlling private entities, and inconsistent
protections offered in different parts of the country would do little to
help the current situation. Therefore, although legislative enactments
would do much to avoid the difficult state action question, it is unlikely
that they would have the speed, uniformity, or predictability necessary
to provide an adequate remedy.
C. CIC Bill of Rights
Similar to a reliance on legislative action to protect free speech in
CICs, some scholars have suggested that residents themselves should
take the initiative to protect free speech in their communities.105 A
Residents’ Bill of Rights106 would ostensibly “provide meaningful
oversight of homeowners associations without unduly restricting the
power of governing boards to carry out their duties and obligations.”107
This position is theoretically supported by advocates for community
associations and boards, who argue that homeowners should shoulder
the burden of setting aside the rights they wish to have in their
communities.108 Homeowners control the boards, and are therefore
freedom of the parties to contract is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
104
See Ronald Perl and Brian Edlin, The Constitutional Conundrum; The Application
of State and Federal Constitutions to Planned Communities and Condominiums, COLL. OF
CMTY. ASS’N LAWYERS, §1.05 (Jan. 24–26, 2013).
105
See, e.g., Suarez, supra note 16, at 758.
106
For potential wording of such a Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, see French, supra
note 8, at 351 (“Speech: The rights of residents to display political signs and symbols
of the kinds normally displayed in or outside of residences located in single-family
residential neighborhoods in their individually owned property shall not be abridged,
except that the association may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
for the purpose of minimizing damage and disturbance to other owners and
residents.”); see also Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 515–34 (2009).
107
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 768 (discussing legislative enactments that
would function similarly to a homeowner’s “Bill of Rights”).
108
Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 260 (“HOA members do have the ability to
change the covenants of the HOA through a vote of the members. Thus, there appears
to be a political remedy built into the HOA structure: if enough homeowners want to
make a change, they can vote to make that change.”); see also infra Part 0 (suggesting
that residents and boards should collaboratively change their CC&Rs to reflect
reasonable allowances of free expression).
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able to amend the associations’ governing documents as they
collectively see fit.
In reality, though, residents cannot be relied upon to protect free
speech rights in their own communities. As an initial matter, CC&Rs
are almost always set before the sale of any homes, and usually exist for
good reasons.109 In CICs, although select residents may be upset that
their expression is limited, many more are thankful that there are
restrictions to insulate the community from potentially disruptive
speech.110 More fundamentally, even if the will exists,111 boards exercise
significant control over the legislative process within associations and
can greatly hinder any attempt to amend the CC&Rs to add such a bill
of rights.112 As the desire to extend free speech methods in CICs will
often be a minority position, it is unlikely that it will ever command the
majority necessary to pass a Bill of Rights.

Therefore, while it may certainly help the situation for residents
and boards to seek out internal solutions to free speech problems,113 a
“Bill of Rights” cannot be relied on as the only, or even primary,
method of safeguarding free speech rights in CICs.
D. Applying a Constitutional Analysis: The New Jersey Approach
The New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the matter into its own
hands,114 devising a unique test under its state constitution that extends
free speech rights without deeming CICs state actors.115 After the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Pruneyard116 that states could find greater free

109

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
111
In addition to homeowners who actively support restrictions, apathy is also a
major impediment to marshaling the will to amend the governing documents.
Because many communities count non-votes as “no” votes, an indifferent owner is just
as damaging as an owner who actually votes “no” on an amendment.
112
Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 260 (“[T]he notion that homeowners can makes
changes to CC&Rs once becoming home-owning members of HOAs is largely
illusory.”).
113
See infra Part 0 (arguing that while a more significant solution is necessary,
boards and residents would do well to preemptively modernize their CC&Rs to protect
reasonable amounts of free expression).
114
The only other court that has utilized the New Jersey approach was a Missouri
state court in Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Ass’n, 2013 No. 12-JE CC0027,
WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013). See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
115
See generally Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 73 (2014).
116
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also supra note
44.
110
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speech protections under their own constitutions than the U.S.
Constitution, and thus could extend free speech protections to certain
kinds of private property,117 New Jersey was one of the first states to take
that leap.118
In its first post-Pruneyard foray into the issue of free speech in a
traditionally private sphere, the New Jersey Supreme Court
determined in State v. Schmid119 that there are certain instances where
the public nature of private property begets some constitutional
protections.120 The court recognized that “as private property
becomes, on a sliding scale, committed either more or less to public
use and enjoyment, there is . . . a counterbalancing between
expressional and property rights.”121 In order to effectuate this
understanding, the court developed a new test to determine the extent
to which expression on privately-owned property can reasonably be
restricted:

This standard must take into account (1) the nature,
purposes, and primary use of such private property,
generally, its ‘normal’ use, (2) the extent and nature of the
public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose
of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property
in relation to both the private and public use of the property.
This is a multi-faceted test which must be applied to ascertain
whether in a given case owners of private property may be
required to permit, subject to suitable restrictions, the
reasonable exercise by individuals of the constitutional
freedoms of speech and assembly.122
Utilizing this test, the court held that Schmid was entitled to enter the
campus of Princeton University and distribute political materials,
despite a lack of permission from the University.123 This important
holding opened the door slightly for those whose free speech was
limited in other traditionally private spheres, and set the stage for New
117

In Pruneyard, the Supreme Court had held that California could extend free
speech guarantees to private shopping centers under its own state Constitution. 447
U.S. at 79–80.
118
See supra note 44.
119
84 N.J. 535 (1980).
120
Id. at 567.
121
Id. at 561 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)).
122
Id. at 563.
123
Id. at 567–68 (“[I]n the absence of a reasonable regulatory scheme, Princeton
University did in fact violate defendant’s State constitutional rights of expression in
evicting him and securing his arrest . . . .”).

PESCE (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/22/2015 5:07 PM

COMMENT

899

Jersey’s unique development of this constitutional framework.
More than a decade later, the New Jersey Supreme Court
extended the ruling of Schmid, holding in New Jersey Coalition Against
War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corporation124 that regional private
shopping malls had to permit leafleting on societal issues.125 In
Coalition, the court added a new balancing test pitting expressional
rights versus private property rights,126 which stood for the proposition
that the more private property is utilized for public purposes, the more
expressional rights may be enjoyed upon it.127 The court noted that
the owners of the shopping mall had “intentionally transformed their
property into a public square or market, a public gathering place, a
downtown business district, a community,”128 which meant that “[t]he
sliding scale [could not] slide any farther in the direction of public use
and diminished private property interests.”129 On the private property
interest side of the balancing test, the court observed that the plaintiff’s
type of free speech was “substantial in [New Jersey’s] constitutional
scheme”130 and that leafleting could be done without seriously
infringing on the rights of other guests.131 After considering these
interests, the court determined that the Schmid factors, as well as the
general balancing, tilted in favor of allowing leafleting.132
In its third major return to the question of free speech rights in
private settings, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated in Committee
for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Association133 that a lack
of state action is not an impediment to invoking free speech
protections in the New Jersey constitution.134 For the first time, this
124

138 N.J. 326 (1994).
Cf. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899 (1979) (expanding free
speech protections to shopping malls in California).
126
Coalition, 138 N.J. at 362–63.
127
Id. at 363 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)) (“The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.”).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Coalition, 138 N.J. at 365 (“We are totally satisfied that on balance plaintiff’s
expressional rights prevail over defendants’ private property interests. We are further
satisfied that the interference by defendants with plaintiff’s rights constitutes
unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct.”).
133
192 N.J. 344 (2007).
134
The court stated that “the rights of free speech and assembly under our
constitution are not only secure from interference by governmental or public bodies,
but under certain circumstances from the interference by the owner of private
125
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precedent was applied to the actions of a private residential entity;135
specifically, a policy restricting the size, number, and placement of
signs within the community.136 Applying the Schmid/Coalition test, the
court determined that the restrictions were not unreasonable and thus
not unconstitutional, as they were merely time, place, and manner
restrictions and residents had reasonable alternative opportunities to
express themselves.137 Although the court ultimately found for the
association138 and the opinion was somewhat “ambiguous and
confusing,”139 the Twin Rivers decision nonetheless appeared to open
the door even more for the eventual extension of free speech rights
into CICs.140
Just five years later, in Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners Assn. v.
Khan,141 the New Jersey Supreme Court delivered a resounding victory
for free speech in CICs, becoming the first state to strike down signage
restrictions of a private CIC as violative of the state constitution. The
court again repeated that “[i]n New Jersey, an individual’s affirmative
right to speak freely ‘is protected not only from abridgement by
government, but also from unreasonably restrictive and oppressive
conduct by private entities’ in certain situations.”142 Yet the court noted
that the facts of Mazdabrook, where a resident posted a political sign
endorsing his own candidacy and was fined pursuant to the
association’s blanket sign restriction, required a different
interpretation of the Schmid/Coalition test than the one conducted in
property as well.” Id. at 364. The court also left no doubt about its departure from the
state action doctrine, saying: “Simply stated, we have not followed the approach of
other jurisdictions to require some state action before the free speech and assembly
clauses under our constitution may be invoked.” Id.
135
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 733.
136
Twin Rivers, 192 N.J. at 351 (The covenant held that “residents [could] post a
sign in any window of their residence and outside in the flower beds so long as the sign
was no more than three feet from the residence. . . . The policy also forb[ade] the
posting of signs on utility poles and natural features within the community.”).
137
Id. at 368.
138
Id.
139
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 743.
140
Franzese and Siegel stressed the subtle importance of the Twin Rivers decision:
Although at first glance the Twin Rivers decision does not appear to
constitute a bold proclamation of new doctrine, a more careful analysis
of the Court’s opinion reveals that the Court did indeed announce the
framework of a new constitutional approach to CICs. That framework,
although largely undefined in its details, provides a conceptual basis for
a robust constitutional right of free speech and assembly applicable to
CIC residents.
Id. at 733.
141
Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482 (2012).
142
Id. at 493 (citations omitted).
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Twin Rivers.143 Because the owner was not an outsider and actually
owned the property on which the speech was expressed, a test that
pitted expressional rights versus private property rights was an
inadequate means to assess the tradeoff.144 Therefore, the court
focused on the third Schmid factor and engaged in a more general
balancing of Khan’s expressional rights versus the negative impact this
speech had on the Association’s property and common areas.145 After
observing that Khan held a legitimate right to free speech on his own
residential property and that his speech had minimal interference with
Association property,146 the court concluded that his rights outweighed
the aesthetic interests of the Association, and that the outright ban on
signs was unconstitutional.147

Despite Mazdabrook’s win for free speech, the test for evaluating
free speech rights in CICs had become significantly muddled,148 and
lower courts appeared unsure of how to apply the test to differing
factual circumstances.149 Seeking to clarify this standard, the New
Jersey Supreme Court recently decided Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave.
Owners, Inc.,150 in which it unanimously articulated a new test for
analyzing restrictions on speech within CICs.
In Dublirer, a
community’s “House Rule”151 banned solicitation and distribution of
143

Id. at 498–99.
Id. The court explained that because Khan owned the property, “the first
two Schmid factors [did] not favor near-absolute limits on placing a political sign inside
[his] own home.” Id. at 499.
145
Id. at 501.
146
Id. at 501–03.
147
Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 503.
148
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 747 (noting that the court had left
“undefined the scope and application of this constitutional remedy,” and remarking
that there could be “many years of appellate litigation before the precise contours of
this remedy are fully delineated”).
149
See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., No. A-4800-08T3, 2011 WL
3586139 (App. Div. 2011), aff’d, 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (where the Appellate Division
purported to apply the Schmid test but failed to address how each prong of the test is
to be assessed and valued, and neglected to discuss how the test changed based on the
type of property and nature of the restriction).
150
220 N.J. 71 (2014).
151
Because the building in question was a private cooperative apartment building
(often referred to as a “co-op”), which features residents who purchase shares of the
building and hold leasehold interests in their units, the House Rule was enforced by a
Board of Directors and not a Homeowners Association. Although this difference may
implicate different concerns, see Oral Argument, Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave.
Owners,
Inc.,
220
N.J.
71
(2014)
(No.
A-125-11),
available
144
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literature in common areas of the property without board approval.152
A resident in the building ran for the Board of Directors and sought
to distribute campaign literature on the premises, but the Board
denied his request.153 The resident filed suit challenging the “House
Rule,” the trial judge found for the Board, and the plaintiff appealed.154
The Appellate Division applied the well-known Schmid threefactor test, and found that although the community was private and
there was no public invitation to the property,155 the restriction
nonetheless failed the test because it was unreasonable.156 The court
noted that the policy was especially unreasonable because it did not
allow for any alternative means of expression157 and seemed to
discriminate based on content.158 But because of the “ambiguous and
confusing”159 nature of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s previous
discussions of free speech in CICs, many issues remained unaddressed
in the decision: (1) specific Supreme Court language appeared to
contradict the Appellate Division’s holding;160 (2) it was unclear how a
covenant could fail the Schmid test when two of the three factors
militated in its favor;161 and (3) no court had addressed whether the
at http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-125-11 (where various questions were asked
about the distinctions between different communities), the New Jersey Supreme Court
has not officially weighed in on this issue.
152
The rule in question provided:
There shall be no solicitation or distribution of any written materials
anywhere upon the premises without authorization of the Board of
Directors. Without prior consent of the Board of Directors, no sign or
notice shall be placed upon the bulletin board, [in] the mail room, in
the halls, lobby, elevators or on the doorways. A bulletin board for
residents[’] use is provided [near] the rear door.
Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 251–52.
153
Id. at 252.
154
Dublirer, 2011 WL 3586139, at *1.
155
Id. at *4.
156
Id. at *6.
157
Id. at *5.
158
Id. at *6. It is important to note here that the Board of Directors did not evenlyapply the rule. For one, there was evidence that that Board itself engaged in the exact
type of speech it prohibited the residents to engage in, namely in distributing
newsletters that attacked the Board’s critics. Id. at *2. In addition, the Board
permitted local police and firefighters to solicit donations by knocking on doors. Id.
These facts tend to indicate that the Board discriminated based on content, and
although the Appellate Division did not explicitly hold this, it undoubtedly influenced
the perception of the reasonableness of the rule. Id. at *6; Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood
Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 88–89 (2014).
159
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 743.
160
See infra note 167.
161
The Appellate Division neglected to discuss the nature of the interaction
between the different prongs of the Schmid test. Do all prongs need to be satisfied for
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analysis changed based on the identity of the speaker and type of
community.162
Recognizing these deficiencies, the New Jersey Supreme Court
issued somewhat of a mea culpa in Dublirer, admitting that
the Schmid/Coalition test [is] not a perfect fit for private
residential communities. The first prong of the Schmid test,
for example, is largely subsumed by the issue itself. In the
case of restrictions imposed by the board of a private
common-interest community of dwellings, the primary
nature and use of the property, by definition, is private. The
second prong—the extent of the public’s invitation to use
the property—is even less relevant because residents do not
need an invitation to use property in their own community.163
Thus, in an attempt to “clarify the standard,”164 the court declared that
the Schmid test should no longer be applied when the speaker is an
owner, not a visitor.165 In those situations, “courts should [instead]
focus on ‘the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken’ in
relation to the property’s use . . . and should also consider the ‘general
balancing of expressional rights and private property rights.’”166 Thus,
in its clearest decision since Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court
finally stated what the test really was all along: a balancing test between
free expression and property rights.167 Applying this new test to the
a defendant to prevail? Must all prongs be satisfied for a plaintiff to win? The court
decided that the first two prongs weighed in favor of the association, but found that
the third factor, which weighed in favor of the resident, trumped the first two and
necessitated a finding for the plaintiff. Dublirer, 2011 WL 3586139, at *4–5.
162
See supra note 151.
163
Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 84–85.
164
Id. at 85. See also Frank Askin, N.J. Supreme Court Decision Clarifies Rules for Condo
Associations,
Other
Properties,
THE
STAR-LEDGER
(Dec.
11,
2014),
http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/12/nj_supreme_court_decision_clarifi
es_rules_for_condo_associations_other_properties_opinion.html (suggesting that
“the Court took the occasion to clarify the law and end the confusion caused by the
Twin Rivers opinion”).
165
Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 84–85.
166
Id. at 85 (quoting State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against
War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 362 (1994)).
167
Although it shored up some of the problems with the previous test, Dublirer
arguably raised as many questions as it answered. For one, express New Jersey
Supreme Court language seems to directly contradict the holding in this case. In two
different decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly said:
The list of ‘horribles’ suggested by defendants as the inevitable
consequence of our holding for other forms of private property should
be dealt with now, rather than in some future litigation. No highway
strip mall, no football stadium, no theater, no single huge suburban
store, no stand-alone use, and no small to medium shopping center
sufficiently satisfies the standard of Schmid to warrant the constitutional
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facts, the court held that the “House Rule” was unconstitutional
because Dublirer’s important interest in promoting his candidacy and
communicating his views about community to governance
“outweigh[ed] the minor interference that neighbors w[ould] face
from a leaflet under their door.”168
With this line of cases, New Jersey is unquestionably at the
forefront of adopting a more flexible approach to extending free
speech rights to CICs.169 And this constitutional framework is likely a
better solution than any of the aforementioned theories, such as
treating CICs as state actors,170 relying on legislative action,171 or
pushing residents to protect their own interests.172 It is reasonable,
faster than legislative action, and more reliable than depending on
residents to fix the problem themselves. Yet the ongoing saga from
Schmid to Dublirer underscores the difficulty other states will likely
encounter if they choose to adopt New Jersey’s approach to free
extension of free speech to those premises, and we so hold.
Coalition, 138 N.J. at 373; Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’
Ass’n, 192 N.J. 344, 361 (2007). The court never addressed this language in Dublirer.
Second, it is still unclear whether slight factual differences fundamentally change the
constitutional inquiry. For example, what if the building is a small, two-family building
as opposed to a large condominium complex? Is there a difference between an HOA
and a co-op? How does the inquiry change for requests by residents to express
themselves through community newsletters or community websites? Is there less
protection when the speech involved is political, as opposed to “political-like” in
Dublirer? Third, the court has suggested that knowing and intelligent waiver might not
be possible for free speech rights in the CIC context, Mazdabrook Commons
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 505–06 (2012), but it has not further
explained this proposition, and it is still unclear whether waiver no longer applies.
These and many more questions abound, and will seemingly require the court to
return to this issue very soon.
168
Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 89.
169
As it stands, only one other court has followed the reasoning of the New Jersey
Supreme Court and extended state constitutional protections to private CICs. The
first and only extra-state extension of New Jersey’s constitutional approach was by a
Missouri state court in Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Ass’n, 2013 No. 12-JE
CC0027, WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013), which involved facts “nearly identical”
to Mazdabrook. Id. at *3. In Tiara at the Abbey, a covenant mandated that “no sign of
any kind shall be displayed to the public view” but made exceptions for “for sale” signs
and signs placed by the builder or remodeler to advertise the property. Id. at *1. In
its analysis of the constitutionality of the covenant, the court engaged in an almost
identical analysis as the New Jersey Supreme Court, complete with a discussion of the
expansiveness of the Missouri state constitution, the fundamental importance of
political speech, an analysis of the Schmid factors, and the Coalition balancing test. Id.
at *2–4. Based on these considerations, the court determined, similarly to Mazdabrook,
that a restriction on political signage is an unreasonable restriction and
unconstitutional under Article I, § 8 of Missouri’s constitution. Id.
170
See supra Part IV.A.
171
See supra Part IV.B.
172
See supra Part IV.C.
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speech in CICs. Therefore, as discussed in more detail in Part B,
although the New Jersey test is noble for the results it commands, its
complexity and unpredictability make it difficult to apply even in New
Jersey, much less the rest of the country.
V. STRIKING COVENANTS AS UNREASONABLE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY:
WHY THE RESTATEMENT TEST PROVIDES THE MOST WORKABLE
SOLUTION
This Comment argues that the position taken by the Restatement
(Third) of Property (“Restatement”) is the most viable method of
extending free speech to CICs. The Restatement suggests that courts
should find a servitude “invalid if it is illegal, unconstitutional, or
violates public policy.”173 In this way, by allowing courts to strike free
speech restrictions that contravene public policy, the Restatement
provides a contract and property-based means of ensuring that
residents in CICs are given reasonable freedom of expression. This
attempts to shift the discussion from somewhat distracting
constitutional arguments to more substantive and thoughtful ones like
“whether the arrangement poses such risks to the social good that
judicial modification or nullification is warranted.”174
And since judicial non-enforcement of covenants as unreasonable
against public policy is a “long-standing axiom of contract law,”175 the
Restatement’s suggestion is not so much a novel suggestion as it is the
modern application of a time-tested approach. In this way, the
Restatement test provides a method of guaranteeing free expression in
CICs that is simple, reliable, and replicable around the country.
A. Overview of the Restatement Test
The Restatement test closely resembles the test the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently articulated in Dublirer,176 in that it requires a
balancing between the benefit derived from a covenant versus the
harm of leaving the restriction in place.177 The Restatement begins by
commanding that a servitude:
is valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates
public policy. Servitudes that are invalid because they violate
public policy include, but are not limited to:
(1) a servitude that is arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious;
173
174
175
176
177

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (2000).
Id.
In re Village Homes of Colorado, Inc., 405 B.R. 479, 483 (2009).
Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 84 (2014).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. e (2000).
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(2) a servitude that unreasonably burdens a fundamental
constitutional right;
(3) a servitude imposes an unreasonable restraint on
alienation under § 3.4 or § 3.5;
(4) a servitude that imposes an unreasonable restraint on
trade or competition under § 3.6; and
(5) a servitude that is unconscionable under § 3.7.178
If the servitude does not fall clearly into one of these prohibitions, the
Restatement requires courts to weigh the “interests in enforcing the
servitude” against the “public interests that would be adversely affected
by leaving the servitude in force.”179

As to the first element, which considers the interests served by the
servitude, the Restatement test begins with the presumption that all
covenants are valid.180 This presumption recognizes that “policies
favoring freedom of contract, freedom to dispose of one’s property,
and protection of legitimate-expectation interests nearly always weigh
in favor of the validity of voluntarily created servitudes.”181 To
accommodate this assumption, the Restatement shifts the burden to
the party claiming that a servitude should be struck down as a violation
of public policy,182 and places strong reliance on waiver, though
without mentioning it by name.183 Courts may also look to the
community benefits derived from the restriction, such as attempts to
be free from offensive speech, freedom from litter, and freedom of
privacy.184
As to the second half of the balancing test, courts must then
consider what societal interests would be adversely affected if the
servitude were left in place.185 This hinges on what constitutes “public

178

Id. at § 3.1.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (2000).
180
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. (“If the principal costs of a servitude fall on the parties who have accepted
the burdened property in circumstances in which they should have understood the
costs, courts should be reluctant to invalidate the servitude, no matter how costly it
turns out to be to one of the parties . . . .”).
184
See generally Brief for Community Associations Institute – New Jersey Chapter as
Putative Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20–25, Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood
Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (No. A-125-11) (discussing, among other things,
some of the bargained-for benefits of covenants restricting leafleting).
185
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. i (2000).
179
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policy,” a definition courts have grappled with for decades.186 The
general concept of public policy in the servitudes context is that:
An agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to the
interest of the public, contravenes some established interest
of society, violates some public statute, is against good
morals, tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety,
or, as it is sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of
society and is in conflict with public morals.187
At first glance, this seems an impossible task; such an undefined
standard would be wholly subjective, unpredictable, and unfair.188 But
the Restatement addresses this issue head-on; it readily acknowledges
that the concept of public policy is “somewhat amorphous”189 and
undertakes to simplify this judicial method through a set of standards
to evaluate public policy.190
186

William Story remarked more than a century ago that
[p]ublic policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with
the habits and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and the
usages of trade, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree
of exactness. It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left
loose and free of definition, in the same manner as fraud. This rule may,
however, be safely laid down, that wherever any contract conflicts with
the morals of the time, and contravenes any established interest of
society, it is void, as being against public policy.
WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 675 (1874); see also
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403–404 (1960) (noting that
“[p]ublic policy is a term not easily defined” because “[i]ts significance varies as the
habits and needs of a people may vary”).
187
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305, 314 (Ch. Div. 2002) (quoting
Garlinger v. Garlinger, 129 N.J. Super. 37, 40 (Ch. Div. 1974)).
188
Cf. supra Part D (criticizing the New Jersey approach as being similarly
undefined and unpredictable).
189
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (2000).
190
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i. This entire portion of the comment reads:
Resolving claims that a servitude violates public policy requires assessing
the impact of the servitude, identifying the public interests that would
be adversely affected by leaving the servitude in force, and weighing the
predictable harm against the interests in enforcing the servitude. Only
if the risks of social harm outweigh the benefits of enforcing the
servitude is the servitude likely to be held invalid. The policies favoring
freedom of contract, freedom to dispose of one’s property, and
protection of legitimate expectation interests nearly always weigh in
favor of the validity of voluntarily created servitudes. A host of other
policies, too numerous to catalog, may be adversely impacted by
servitudes. Policies favoring privacy and liberty in choice of lifestyle,
freedom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, access to the
legal system, discouraging bad faith and unfair dealing, encouraging
free competition, and socially productive uses of land have been
implicated by servitudes. Other policies that become involved may
include those protecting family relationships from coercive attempts to
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The Restatement offers that sources of public policy can be “the
product of judicial development, or they may be based on legislation,
or on the provisions of state or federal constitutions.”191 In considering
the public policy interests espoused by state constitutions and
legislative actions, the Restatement test is effectively a consolidation of
multiple proposed solutions.192 For example, even if the state
constitution could not be applied to private actions due to the state
action doctrine, it could nonetheless provide a basis for judges to strike
down restrictions as violative of public policy.193 And even if legislatures
are not able to proactively protect every method of free expression
through legislation, its existing pronouncements could be used by
judges in considering whether the legislature would prefer to protect
the type of expression in question.194 As a result, courts may look to
these and other sources to determine whether striking down the
covenant in question implicates interests such as “privacy and liberty
in choice of lifestyle, freedom of religion, [and] freedom of speech
and expression.”195 If the court finds that these interests outweigh the
benefits of enforcing the servitude, then the court may void the
servitude as offensive to public policy.196
But the Restatement does not stop there. In order to give courts
further guidance, the Restatement also puts forth various illustrations
to describe types of covenants that would not survive the public policy

disrupt them, and protecting weaker groups in society from servitudes
that exclude them from opportunities enjoyed by more fortunate groups
to acquire desirable property for housing or access to necessary services.
191
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. f; see also Allen v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 477–
78 (N.J. 1944) (suggesting that “[t]he sources determinative of public policy are,
among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial
decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing
concepts of the federal and state governments relating to and affecting the safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of the people for whom government — with us —
is factually established”).
192
See supra Part B (discussing the suggestion that legislatures should take the lead
on extending free speech rights); Part D (discussing New Jersey’s approach of using
the state constitution’s expansive First Amendment to strike down restrictions on
speech).
193
See, e.g., Kolbet, supra note 92, at 107 (“In Texas, because the state Constitution
provides broad free speech protection, a Texas court could rightly hold that a total
ban on political signs violated public policy, and was therefore unenforceable.”).
194
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. f (2000) (“Courts may
apply the policies manifested by legislation more broadly than the legislation provides,
but they may not refuse to apply policies manifested by legislation in situations to
which it clearly applies.”).
195
Id. § 3.1 cmt. i.
196
Id.
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analysis.197 These include covenants that unreasonably restrict criticism
of the community association,198 the posting of political signs,199 display
of an American flag,200 and door-to-door solicitation of signatures by an
outside citizens group.201 These illustrations give courts a useful
framework for conducting the public policy balancing test and help to
ensure that the test is conducted consistently by any court that applies
it.
As with the other proposed theories, there are of course
imperfections with the Restatement approach. As an initial matter,
courts are extremely reluctant to interfere in the contractual relations
of two private parties in the name of public policy.202 This is bolstered
by the fact that servitudes are now considered extremely valuable
aspects of property.203 Thus, declaring them void as against public
policy might decrease the expected value of residents’ properties.
In addition, how are courts to weigh competing public policy
considerations, when each is compelling? Certainly, as stated
poignantly by the Texas Supreme Court, one very important public
197

Id. at § 3.1 Illustrations.
Id. § 3.1 illus. 5.
199
Id. § 3.1 illus. 7 (noting that “the harm to the public interest in citizen
participation in political debate outweighs the value of validating the servitude”
because “reasonable alternative means of exercising the right are not available”).
200
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 illus. 8 (2000) (explaining that
flag restrictions would be void because “[d]isplay of the flag has strong expressive
value, ready alternatives are not available, and the adverse impacts on other
subdivision lot owners are not likely to be substantial”). But see id. at illus. 9 (explaining
that a size restriction on a displayed American flag is not voidable because smaller flags
provide adequate means of expression and large or numerous flags may hurt
aesthetics).
201
Id. at illus. 18 (explaining that if a covenant denied access to anyone not a
resident or his invitee, the “burden on the exercise of political speech rights of the
Citizens group [would] outweigh[] the benefit to the residents of freedom from
intrusion”).
202
See, e.g., Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544, 553 (Tex. 2001), superseded
on other grounds by statute, Tex. Lab. Code § 406.033(e) (“Courts must exercise judicial
restraint in deciding whether to hold arm’s-length contracts void on public policy
grounds.”); RSN Properties, Inc. v. Eng’g Consulting Servs., Ltd., 301 Ga. App. 52, 53
(2009) (quoting Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 393 (1981)) (“[T]he courts
must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and
should do so only in cases free from doubt.”).
203
Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1416–17 (2013) (“The modern approach recognizes that servitudes are not
merely encumbrances on property that should be narrowly construed but that they are
valuable property rights in themselves, precisely because of the stability they provide
to the owners of dominant estates. That is why most courts have repudiated the
traditional notion that ambiguous covenants should be interpreted narrowly in favor
of free use of land, adopting instead the modern idea that they should be interpreted
to achieve the intent of the grantor.”); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
198
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policy is the right to contract itself:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy
requires it is that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by
Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public
policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with
this freedom of contract.204
This quote illustrates the undeniable tension throughout the country
between public free speech interests and the freedom to contract.205 As
a result, despite the Restatement’s attempts to normalize its prescribed
analysis, there is still sufficient wiggle room in the balancing test that
might only further perpetuate the inconsistencies currently found in
CICs throughout the country.
These imperfections raise the question: Why is the Restatement’s
balancing test any better than, say, New Jersey’s balancing test?206
B. Why the Restatement Test is the Best Method of Extending
Reasonable Free Speech Rights to CICs
Although the Restatement’s prescribed test is by no means
perfect, it nonetheless provides the best method of expanding free
speech rights to CICs.
First, the Restatement provides a non-constitutional method of
striking down unreasonable restrictions on speech, which should
always be considered before a constitutional method of adjudication.207
In general, courts are hesitant to “reach a constitutional question
unless its resolution is imperative to the disposition of litigation.”208
This theme of constitutional avoidance was articulated years ago by
204

Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653, 664 (Tex.
2008) (quoting Wood Motor Co., Inc. v. Nebel, 150 Tex. 86, 93 (1951)).
205
See Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Steven W.
Feldman, Tennessee Practice: Contract Law and Practice § 7:3, at 732 (2006) (“The need
for delicacy arises because exercising the authority ‘to declare contracts as void as
against public policy is in tension with freedom of contract and the need to bind
parties to their voluntary agreements.’”)).
206
See generally Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014).
207
See generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving
a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter.”).
208
Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 504 n.4
(2012) (quoting Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006)).
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Frank Askin, one of the foremost advocates for the extension of free
speech rights in the country:
Because state courts always retain the common law power to
strike down regulations they find unreasonable and against
public policy, it is seldom necessary to fall back on
constitutional principles when deciding disputes between
the association and a member. Any rule that a court might
find to be unconstitutional will probably be invalidated on
common law principles—although it is true that several cases
in Florida have referred to constitutional protections for free
speech and family privacy to invalidate rules found to be
unnecessarily restrictive of individual autonomy. However,
the references to constitutional principles were unnecessary
because those courts could have come to the exact same
conclusions on common law grounds.209
Since this caution by Askin, New Jersey and other courts have
nonetheless engaged in confusing, inconsistent, and unpredictable
constitutional analyses.210 Because voiding servitudes as violative of
public policy is a separate and independent means of reaching the
same result,211 courts should never even reach the constitutional
analysis.
Second, the constitutional analysis is far more complicated than
209

Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 947,
955–56 (1998).
210
Interestingly enough, Frank Askin recently argued for the ACLU in the Dublirer
case, where he asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to strike down a restriction on
leafleting as unconstitutional. He does not appear to have made any mention of nonconstitutional methods of adjudication.
211
For example, the Restatement’s Illustration 5 poses almost the exact same
factual situation as Dublirer. It reads:
The declaration of servitudes for Harmony Village includes a provision
prohibiting owners and residents from criticizing actions taken by the
board of directors or the architectural-control committee except at
regularly scheduled meetings of the board. A resident unhappy about a
board decision to construct a new tennis court distributed a flyer to
residents criticizing the board decision. Exercising its power to enforce
the servitudes by fines, the board imposed a $1,000 fine on the resident.
In the absence of other facts or circumstances, the conclusion would be
justified that the prohibition on criticism of board actions is invalid
because it unreasonably burdens freedom of speech.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 illus. 5 (2000); cf. Dublirer v. 2000
Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (where a co-op Board of Directors
selectively enforced a prohibition on leafleting, such that criticized its opponents in a
regular newsletter but prohibited its opponents from doing the same). Thus, in a
jurisdiction that utilized the Restatement, the five-year litigation of Dublirer would likely
have been completely unnecessary, either because the Board would have had
constructive notice (through the Illustrations) that such a practice would be improper,
or because this would have been an open-and-shut case in the trial court.
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the Restatement’s property-based test.212 For example, in Mazdabrook,
the New Jersey Supreme Court devoted over ten pages of legal analysis
to the constitutional issues presented by a sign restriction, despite
tackling an extremely similar case only five years earlier.213 The court
also briefly engaged in the type of property-based analysis that the
Restatement suggests,214 but came to the same conclusion in only two
paragraphs.215 Therefore, not only does it appear that the court was
not forced to engage the constitutional question at all, but it also seems
that the court chose the more difficult method.
Third, the property-based analysis is replicable throughout the
United States. Unlike New Jersey, which stands alone in bypassing the
state action doctrine and applying its state constitution to private
communities,216 most states are simply unable to follow that line of
reasoning without undoing decades of case law217 and ignoring the

212

See supra text accompanying note 139.
Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 492–503. As if that was not enough complex,
constitutional legal analysis on the issue, the court again returned to the issue just two
years later. See Dublirer, 220 N.J. 71.
214
Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 507 (holding that “[t]o the extent that Mazdabrook or
the dissent relies on a restrictive covenants analysis, the Association’s sign policy
likewise fails”).
215
The court further stated:
‘[R]estrictive covenants on real property that violate public policy are
void as unenforceable.’ Twin Rivers, 192 N.J. at 370 (citations omitted).
When courts evaluate whether a covenant burdening land is
enforceable, they must determine whether the covenant is reasonable.
See Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 121 N.J. 196, (1990).
Among other factors that inform that decision is ‘[w]hether the
covenant interferes with the public interest.’ Id. at 211.
This Court explained in Twin Rivers that ‘restrictive covenants that
unreasonably restrict speech—a right most substantial in our
constitutional scheme—may be declared unenforceable as a matter of
public policy.’ Twin Rivers, 192 N.J. at 371. Because the restriction in
question is unreasonable and violates the State’s Constitution, the
covenant that memorializes it is unenforceable.
Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 507 (parallel citations omitted). The court never stated why
this simple property-based analysis was not sufficient to decide the case.
216
New Jersey’s constitutional guarantee of free expression has been described as
“an affirmative right, broader than practically all others in the nation.” Green Party v.
Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 164 N.J. 127, 145 (2000). This alone makes it highly
unlikely that other states can replicate the New Jersey’s constitutional test.
217
See, e.g., supra note 47 and accompanying text. Indeed, even states with almost
identical free speech language in their constitutions as New Jersey’s have declined to
ignore the state action requirement. For example, Michigan’s constitution is nearly
the same as New Jersey’s, but its courts have nonetheless held that “the federal and the
Michigan constitutional provisions guaranteeing free speech do not extend to private
conduct, but have been limited to protection against state action.” Prysak v. R.L. Polk
Co., 193 Mich. App. 1, 10 (1992).
213
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fundamental doctrine of stare decisis.218 To the contrary, every state
would be able to adopt the Restatement’s approach.219 The practice of
voiding contracts as against public policy is a long-standing mainstay of
jurisprudence220 and is well-established in courts around the country.221
Thus, the Restatement shifts the discussion to which rights society
believes should be protected, as opposed to complex constitutional
discussions over how to extend any rights to otherwise private entities.
Fourth, the Restatement test is more predictable than a
constitutional approach. Through its “Illustrations,” the Restatement
promulgates several types of expression that would not survive such a
public policy analysis.222 If each of these free speech rights is
automatically protected in every state, a valuable uniformity of baseline
free expression rights would be created in the United States.
Moreover, because the Restatement’s illustrations are proactive
pronouncements, as opposed to limited constitutional court rulings
that focus only on the case at hand,223 boards and residents would not
be forced to guess what speech is permitted and could often act before
courts were forced to intermediate.224
218
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated the importance of an adherence to
stare decisis. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Although the Supreme
Court has also said that the reviewing court is not as constrained by the doctrine “when
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned,” id.at 828, the Court also
notes that “[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved,” id. (citations
omitted). Therefore, states with a strong history of disallowing free speech in private
environments may find it difficult to overcome the reliance on stare decisis with such a
new and unique constitutional test.
219
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) (“Even though
there may not be sufficient state action present to justify application of constitutional
limitations to privately created servitudes, the servitude may be invalid as a matter of
state or federal common law because it violates public policy.”).
220
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
221
See supra Part V.A.
222
See supra notes 198–201 (suggesting that associations could not prohibit
criticism of the community association, the posting of political signs, display of the
American flag, and door-to-door solicitation of signatures by an outside citizens
group).
223
See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 747 (“Suffice it to say that it may well
require many years of appellate litigation before the precise contours of this remedy
are fully delineated.”); supra note 211 (arguing that if New Jersey had simply adopted
the Restatement test instead of making piecemeal pronouncements on the
constitutionality of certain free speech restrictions in CICs, the Dublirer case would
never have had to be litigated).
224
In essence, because the New Jersey test does not give much in the way of
guidance for future issues, as opposed to the Restatement, it leaves residents and boards
with mere speculation as to the contours of free speech protections. See also Part 0
(suggesting that in the interim, Boards and residents should use the Restatement
illustrations as guidelines to adopt their own reasonable free speech policies before
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Yet at the same time, the property-based doctrine is necessarily
flexible.225 In a country with different types of CICs in varying
environments, it is beneficial to give courts the opportunity to make
calculations for their own communities.226 The Restatement ensures
that judicial determinations are not made on the most fundamental of
expressional rights,227 but allows individual communities to determine
themselves where to draw the outer membrane of free speech rights in
CICs.228 These less fundamental free expression rights are likely more
local in character, and the Restatement gives courts the flexibility to
fashion their remedies as such.
Fifth, the Restatement test actually considers the important
countervailing issues at stake on both sides of the issue. Although
recent years have seen HOAs exceed reason with overburdensome free
speech restrictions,229 there are undoubtedly good reasons why CC&Rs
are adopted in the first place.230 By beginning with the presumption
that all covenants are valid,231 the Restatement does not make aesthetics
the sacrificial lamb for unbridled free speech rights.232 And in
they are challenged in court).
225
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt i (2000); id. at § 3.1
cmt. f (“Because policies change to meet changing conditions of society, it is not
practicable to predict the policy assessments judges will make in the future.”); STORY,
supra note 186 (describing that the concept of public policy “has been left loose and
free of definition” because it is, by nature, “uncertain and fluctuating”).
226
For example, a CIC in rural Arkansas is likely to be different in structure and
interests than one from New York City, so it would be improper to subject them to the
same exact requirements. Since the public policies in each location will be different,
local communities can decide themselves what is reasonable. Of course, this could
result in harsher treatment of minority positions (like mezuzahs in Arkansas or college
football flags in New York City); but the most important rights are likely protected by
the Restatement’s illustrations, and as discussed below, the ability of the U.S. Supreme
Court to intercede might provide an additional safeguard.
227
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 Illustrations (2000)
(providing examples to inform the courts on what types of restrictive covenants should
be struck down as violating public policy, effectively guaranteeing that those rights
would be protected around the country and leaving only the less essential expressional
rights to be determined by the courts).
228
See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403 (1960) (“Public
policy is a term not easily defined. Its significance varies as the habits and needs of a
people may vary. It is not static and the field of application is an ever increasing one.
A contract, or a particular provision therein, valid in one era may be wholly opposed
to the public policy of another.”).
229
See supra notes 63–66.
230
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
231
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. i (2000).
232
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. j (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, if a servitude serves
some purpose that the purchasers might rationally have agreed to, and its meaning
should have been apparent to the purchasers, a court should not invalidate it simply
because the court believes that most people would not have agreed to it, or that it
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recognizing that a knowing and intelligent waiver may factor into the
analysis,233 the Restatement does not swing the pendulum towards
residents quite as far as the New Jersey Supreme Court has.234 In this
way, the Restatement test is presumably a much more palatable
method for advocates of private contract rights and the maintenance
of uniformity and aesthetics in CICs.235
For those state courts potentially willing to consider the extension
of free speech rights into CICs, it seems clear that the Restatement
provides a method of adjudication that is relatively simple, replicable
around the country, and does not eviscerate the state action doctrine.
Therefore, in looking for ways to extend free speech rights to CICs,
courts should first turn to the prescriptions of the Restatement and a
property-based analysis, as opposed to the constitutional one advanced
by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE IN THE INTERIM?: PROACTIVE ACTION BY HOA
BOARDS TO AMEND THEIR GOVERNING DOCUMENTS
The major difficulty with the Restatement’s prescribed test is that
it is non-binding–a mere recommendation of what the law should be.236
Although Restatements have always been well-respected sources of
produces little benefit.”).
233
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i.
234
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has insinuated that residents may never
waive their rights in a CIC. See Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan,
210 N.J. 482, 506 (2012) (“It is unclear that the approach in this case can result in a
knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.”). Yet the dissents
in the Appellate Division and Supreme Court in Mazdabrook starkly disagreed with the
inapplicability of waiver. See Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, A6106-08T3, 2010 WL 3517030 (App. Div. 2010) (Miniman, J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part), aff’d, 210 N.J. 482 (2012) (“The restriction on signs and the right
to sue to enforce it are included in the bundle of rights, restrictions, encumbrances,
and easements contained in the deed to defendant’s unit. Thus, defendant and all
other unit owners expressly agreed that they would not violate the prohibition on signs
and each owner was empowered to enforce that restriction.”); Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at
511 (Wefing, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividuals are equally entitled to seek shelter from
political debate and division.”).
235
See Christopher J. Wahl, Keeping Heller Out of the Home: Homeowners Associations
and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1012–13 (2013) (“While
[the Restatement test’s] imprecision may lead one to fear that a court may have too
much leeway, the fact that servitudes are protected with a presumption of validity works
against the potential bias or prejudice of a court applying the flexible public policy test
to a servitude.”).
236
See, e.g., Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 580–81 (2010) (citing
Bongaards v. Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 29 (2003)) (noting that “while this court often
considers the various Restatements of the Law as prestigious sources of potentially
persuasive authority, we have never taken the position that this court should abdicate
to the views of the American Law Institute as set forth in its various Restatements”).
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legal authority,237 courts around the country will have to buy into the
Restatement’s reasoning and apply its test faithfully. While this
Comment argues that courts around the country should adopt the
Restatement test and extend reasonable free speech rights to residents
of CICs, it is unlikely that this will happen overnight. In the meantime,
it would behoove both HOAs and residents to proactively amend the
governing documents of their communities to reflect a reasonable
allowance of free expression within CICs. Although boards are often
hesitant to extend more rights to residents, and residents feel
powerless to make changes themselves, working together to offer
reasonable free speech rights in CICs makes sense for several reasons.
First, the tide is changing. HOAs may resist the extension of free
speech into CICs, but the eventual protection of basic expressional
rights in these communities is likely inevitable.238 Given the force of
the Third Restatement,239 powerful and revolutionary court
decisions,240 and compelling scholarly suggestions,241 it is only a matter
of time before free speech protections are imposed on CICs. In order
to have a hand in fashioning the remedies themselves, boards must act
before they are forced by courts, legislatures, and/or residents.242
Second, in some states, boards are putting themselves in difficult
situations by refusing to, or merely neglecting to, amend their

237

See id.; Secondary Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements, and
Treatises, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR., http://guides.library.harvard.edu/content.php?
pid=103327&sid=1036651 (last visited May 20, 2015) (“Restatements are highly
regarded distillations of common law.”).
238
See, e.g., Askin, supra note 209, at 956 (suggesting that “[it] is inevitable in a
society as deeply committed to freedom of expression and communication as ours that
more and more courts are going to” follow New Jersey’s lead in extending free speech
rights to CICs). In fact, even New Jersey’s complex constitutional analysis was recently
adopted elsewhere in the country. See supra note 169 (describing Lamprecht v. Tiara at
the Abbey Homeowners Ass’n, No. 12 JE-CC00227, 2013 WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3,
2013), where a Missouri state court appeared to adopt the New Jersey test in full).
239
See supra Part 0.
240
See supra Part D.
241
See supra note 16; Part 0.
242
For example, following the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Dublirer, a
law firm that represents community associations released a client alert that stated
bluntly: “[The decision] provides a clear message to common interest ownership
community governing boards that they must allow adequate means for community
residents to be able to inexpensively communicate with each other and with the board
and should not try to prevent debate over association political issues or criticism of the
board.” Jonathan H. Katz, Client Alert: N.J. Supreme Court Issues Important Decision
Expanding Community Association Residents’ Free Speech Rights, CONDOLAWNJ (Dec. 8,
2014, 1:11 AM), http://www.condo.hillwallackblog.com/ client-alert-n-j-supremecourt-issues-important-decision-expanding-community-association-residents-freespeech-rights/.
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governing documents.
For one, associations that maintain
unreasonable blanket restrictions on certain types of free expression
may then find it difficult to police any types of expression, even
offensive ones.243 And from a practical standpoint, HOAs that choose
not to amend their documents also run the risk of incurring substantial
litigation costs when their CC&Rs are eventually challenged. The
extension of free speech rights into private entities, and increasingly
CICs, is a fast-growing area of litigation, and there is no sign of it
abating.244 To insulate themselves from the specter of costly litigation,
HOAs would be wise to be proactive and adopt reasonable guidelines
for speech within their communities.
Therefore, boards and residents should preemptively adopt
reasonable free speech protections in their governing documents.
Guidance should be drawn from the Restatement’s “Illustrations,”245
suggestions from the New Jersey Supreme Court,246 and federal247 and
local248 legislative actions. But there are several other animating
principles that boards and residents should consider when amending
and applying their CC&Rs. First, associations should ensure that if a
method of free expression is entirely or mostly prohibited, there are
reasonable alternative means of expression available to residents.249 In
addition, boards should be sure to avoid uneven application of rules;
engaging in the same type of expression that residents are prohibited
from may raise an inference that the board is unreasonably
243

In other words, boards may find it difficult to enforce any restrictions on speech
if they adopt only blanket restrictions, and not reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. For example, if a resident in CIC puts neon signs saying “Obama sucks”
in each one of his windows, what recourse does an HOA have if their entire sign
restriction is declared invalid, but they have adopted no other time, place, and manner
restrictions to prevent this seemingly distasteful display?
244
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
245
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES § 3.1 Illustrations (2000).
246
See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 87–88 (2014)
(providing some examples of “reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions” that
would “serve the community’s interest” but “without unreasonably interfering with
free speech rights”).
247
See, e.g., supra note 66 (describing, among other things, a law passed by Congress
prohibiting bans on flying American flags).
248
Many states have passed legislation seeking to protect certain kinds of political
speech. HOAs should ensure that their CC&Rs reflect these local legislative
pronouncements. See infra Part B; see also, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.009
(prohibiting associations from banning political signs within 90 days preceding and 10
days following the election).
249
See, e.g., Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n,
192 N.J. 344, 358–59 (2007) (quoting State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563 (1980)) (noting
the importance of “whether there exist convenient and feasible alternative means to
individuals to engage in substantially the same expressional activity”).
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discriminating based on content.250 And finally, boards should be
particularly careful when attempting to regulate political speech.251
With the Restatement as a guide, boards’ involvement in
fashioning reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions would
create a beneficial two-way street, where boards and homeowners
could reach a compromise. Only then can this contentious system252
become a collaborative one, where boards and homeowners work
together to safeguard the best interests of the community and its
residents.
VII. CONCLUSION
We live in a country that embraces diversity and celebrates it, yet
too often, CICs seek to create homogenous zones free from various
modes of expression.253 Although time, place, and manner restrictions
are unquestionably necessary to avoid offensive forms of speech, more
stringent restrictions are antithetical to the embracing aspect of
community life in the United States.254
In order to scale back these confining servitudes, there must be
widespread implementation of the options above, but especially court
adoption of the Restatement position. Only then will we be able to
effect the profound change we want to see in CICs. Then, finally, we
will ensure the protection of one of the most important interests in our
CICs, which sits at the base of American democracy: the freedom of
expression.

250

See, e.g., Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 88 (citation omitted) (“Nothing in our case law
permits a group in power to attack its opponents yet bar them from responding in the
same way. ‘As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based.’”).
251
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES § 3.1 illus. 7 (2000) (suggesting
that “application of [a] covenant to prohibit political yard signs is invalid because the
harm to the public interest in citizen participation in political debate outweighs the
value of validating the servitude”); Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 71 (suggesting that political
speech is “entitled to the highest level of protection in our society”).
252
See supra notes 53–54 & 63–65 and accompanying text.
253
See generally supra Part 0.
254
See Low, supra note 69 (expressing that our “retreat to secured enclaves . . .
materially and symbolically contradicts American ethos and values”); Kennedy, supra
note 16, at 763 (“Residential associations cause harms to nonmembers by developing
exclusive communities, by gating formerly public streets and neighborhoods, and by
increasing the fiscal burdens of cities and states.”).

